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ARGUMENT 
I 
BURTON DOES NOT HOLD THE THAT UADA PROVIDES 
AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IN SMALL EMPLOYER CASES 
Defendant's argument misconstrues the decision in Burton v. 
Exam Ctr. Indus., 2000 UT 18, 994 P.2d 1261. The issue decided 
by this court in Burton was whether the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Act, Utah Code Anno. 34A-5-101, etc. (UADA) enunciates a policy 
against age discrimination which is sufficiently public, clear 
and substantial to form the basis for a tort claim for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. This court answered 
that question at paragraph 12 of Burton "We are not persuaded 
that the UADA declares a public policy which is "clear and 
substantial" with respect to small employers." The holding in 
Burton was not that the UADA was the "exclusive remedy" for 
employees of small employers as defendant's brief suggests. 
II 
SEX DISCRIMINATION IS NOT AGE DISCRIMINATION 
In deciding Burton this court considered the legal theories 
and holdings of courts from two sister states; Molesworth v. 
Brandon, 672 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996) from Maryland which stated the 
arguments for Dr. Burton's position and Jennings v. Marralle, 8 
Cal. 4th 121, 876 P.2d 1074, 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. 1994) 
1 
from California. A comparison of these two cases in the context 
of Byers' claim for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy based on sex discrimination is instructive. The claim in 
Jennings was based on age discrimination so it was factually and 
legally akin to the claim in Burton. Molesworth, on the other 
hand was a sex discrimination case. The age versus sex 
distinction is important. Sex discrimination has been illegal, 
to some degree, since the passage of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC §2000e. The federal act enjoining age 
discrimination was enacted later. Discrimination based on sex is 
prohibited across the spectrum of civilized society while age 
discrimination tends to be prohibited in employment. 
The comparison in Utah law also shows the differences 
between age and sex discrimination. In Burton, at paragraph 13, 
this court sustained the trial court's dismissal of Dr. Burton's 
claim "Because we can find no constitutional provision or other 
statute which declares a clear and substantial public policy 
against age discrimination in employment practices ..." The 
court said this dearth of foundational law may well not exist in 
the case of sex, race, religion or disability. Burton at 18. 
Judge Medley is not the only Utah District judge to address 
the question of whether a sex motivated termination by a small 
employer forms the basis for a claim of wrongful termination in 
2 
violation of public policy. On March 19, 2001 the Honorable 
Michael K. Burton considered the same issue in Gottling v. 
Peterson, No. 000210087 (3rd District Ct. Murray Department). In 
his memorandum decision, attached, Judge Burton cited Burton's 
holding that this court had not found sufficient law to support a 
clear and substantial public policy against age discrimination. 
He then found that there was Utah law supporting such a claim 
based on sex discrimination. Judge Burton found that policy in 
the Utah Civil Rights Act, Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1. 
It is hereby declared that the practice of 
discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, 
religion, ancestry, or national origin in business 
establishments or places of public accommodation or in 
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the 
health, safety, and general welfare of this state and 
its inhabitants; and that such discrimination in 
business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, 
violates the public policy of this state. Gottling v. 
Petersen Memorandum Decision at note 2 [emphasis in the 
original] 
Judge Burton noted the Civil Rights Act does not declare age 
discrimination to be against public policy, distinguishing sex 
discrimination claims from those considered in Burton. 
In addition to the Utah Civil Rights Act the Utah State 
Constitution also provides a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex discrimination. Article I, Section I provides; 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, 
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possess and protect property; to worship according to 
the dictates of their consciences; to assemble 
peaceably, protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse 
of that right. 
"Men" as used in Utah law, the Utah Constitution included, means 
men and women. Utah Code Anno. 68-3-12. 
Angela Byers claim of wrongful termination in violation of 
the public policy against sex discrimination is similar to Hubert 
Burton's claim of age discrimination is similar only in that they 
were both discriminated against. The policy against sex 
discrimination is older and more pervasive than that against age 
discrimination. It is clear and substantial. 
Ill 
THE BASES FOR PUBLIC POLICY ARE NOT AS NARROW AS APPELLEES ARGUE 
Appellees suggest that a clear and substantial public policy 
may not be found in Title VII and that such policy may only be 
found in Utah statutes. This court's prior decisions on what law 
will support a clear and substantial public policy indicate 
otherwise. 
In Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992) the court 
examined federal and Missouri law and found there was a clear and 
substantial public policy. At pages 1282-83 of Peterson the 
court examined the use of federal law and the law of other states 
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and held vx [p] ersons who are terminated from their employment 
because they refuse to engage in illegal activities that 
implicate clear and substantial Utah public policy considerations 
should be protected regardless of whether the applicable law is 
that of Utah, the federal government, or another state." The 
issue is not who enacted the law but does it reflect a clear and 
substantial public policy of Utah. 
In Peterson the court also said it would not require that 
the foundational law be directly applicable to the claiming 
employee so long as that law reflected Utah public policy. At 
note two of Peterson the court cited the Utah Protection of 
Public Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1986 & 
Supp. 1991). There the court acknowledged that that statute did 
not apply to Mr. Peterson because he was not a public employee. 
Nonetheless the court said; 
While the statute does not specifically limit the 
rights of private employers or address the employer who 
directs an employee to engage in unlawful conduct, it 
does reflect legislative approval of the basic 
proposition that it is against the public policy of the 
state for employers to discharge employees who seek to 
act within the law. 
In Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 P.2d 395, 406 (Utah 
1998) this court examined 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 and 21 U.S.C. § 
801. Section 1306.04 as possible bases for clear and substantial 
public policy. In Ryan the employee was denied relief. If the 
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basis for that denial had been that federal statutes and 
regulations can never provide the foundational law for a clear 
and substantial public policy in Utah the court would not have 
engaged in five pages of analysis of the federal code and 
regulations but would have merely said the foundational law must 
be Utah law. Government regulations promulgated by authorized 
officials may also be the foundational law for a clear and 
substantial public policy in Utah. 
In short, this court's prior decisions hold that to be an 
appropriate foundation for a clear and substantial and 
substantial public policy in Utah a law; a) may be a statute of 
this state, of another state or of the United States, b) need not 
be directly applicable to the injured employee, and c) may 
include properly promulgated regulations. 
In Burton this court distinguished Dr. Burton's claim from 
those in Molesworth because Maryland had statutes, an executive 
order and a constitutional provision proscribing sex 
discrimination. Byers has shown this court a Utah Constitutional 
provision, a Utah statute specifically stating the public policy 
of Utah, numerous executive orders, and numerous regulations 
which show that there is a clear and substantial public policy 
against sex discrimination in the Utah workplace, regardless of 
size. 
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There can be no question that the policy is clear. "A 
public policy is "clear" only if plainly defined by legislative 
enactments, constitutional standards, or judicial decisions. Ryan 
at 405. The policy against sex discrimination is specifically 
and clearly stated in Utah Code Anno. 13-7-1, the executive 
orders, and the regulations. 
The policy is substantial and public. As Ryan states at 
405; 
First, one must ask whether the policy in question is 
one of overarching importance to the public, as opposed 
to the parties only. Second, one must inquire whether 
the public interest is so strong and the policy so 
clear and weighty that we should place the policy 
beyond the reach of contract, thereby constituting a 
bar to discharge that parties cannot modify, even when 
freely willing and of equal bargaining power. 
First, it is difficult to imagine a more overarchingly 
important policy than one which affects the economic life of half 
the population. Second, it goes without saying that women should 
not be required to bargain with their employers differently, and 
less effectively, than men just because of their gender. 
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
The policy against terminating women because of their gender 
is clear, substantial and public. The distinction between the 
sex discrimination case presented by Byers and the age 
discrimination claim asserted in Burton is clear. Byers states a 
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claim upon which relief may be granted. The trial court's order 
dismissing Byers complaint should be reversed and the matter 
remanded for trial. 
Dated this /> 7 day of March, 2001. 
Robert HS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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Attachment 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, MURRAY DEPARTMENT 
TOBY GOTTLING, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
KELLY PETERSON, dba Carbmaster, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 000210087 
Judge Michael K. Burton 
There are several motions pending before the court.1 Plaintiffs motion for partial 
summary judgment and Defendant's cross motion for summary judgment are dispositive of 
certain prominent issues and the Court will address motions first and then move on to the 
remaining motions. 
Summary judgment is warranted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). In 
determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court "viewfs] the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." K & 
T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). Because both parties are moving for 
summary judgment, each motion must be evaluated separately, drawing all inferences in favor of 
1
 1) Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; 
2) Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment; 
3) Plaintiffs Motion to Amend the Complaint; 
4) Plaintiffs Rule 56(f) Motion; 
5) Defendant's Motion for Protective Order; and 
6) Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Plaintiff. 
the non-moving party. 
Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment seeks to eliminate four of the 
Defendant's affirmative defenses which are: 1) That the Defendant is not the real party in interest 
because plaintiff was employed by P.R. Incorporated, LLC, not Kelly Peterson personally; 
2) That because the Plaintiff was employed by a corporation, Defendant Kelly Peterson is not 
personally liable for Plaintiffs wrongful termination; 3) That the PlaintiflPs claims are preempted 
by the Utah Anti-Discrimination Act (UADA); and 4) That the Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies under the UADA. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, on the 
other hand, seeks prevail on three of its affirmative defenses: 1) That the Plaintiffs cause of 
action for wrongful termination in violation of public policy is preempted by the UADA; 2) That 
there is no clear and substantial public policy against firing an employee under the circumstances 
of this case; and 3) That Kelly Peterson cannot be personally liable for the wrongful termination 
of the Plaintiff because P.R., Inc. and not Mr. Peterson was Plaintiffs employer. The Court will 
address each issue in turn. 
Defendant urges that there is no support in Utah law for Plaintiffs cause of action for 
Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy. Defendant further argues that Burton v. 
Exam Center Industries, 994 P.2d 1261 (2000), precludes Plaintiffs claim on the basis that it is 
preempted by the UADA. The Court disagrees with Defendant's contentions. 
There is ample case law in Utah supporting a cause of action for wrongful termination in 
violation of public policy. See generally, Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1992); 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) Most recently the Utah Supreme 
Court addressed the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in Burton v. 
Exam Center Industries. 994 P.2d 1261 (Utah 2000). In that case, the plaintiff alleged that he 
was discriminated against on the basis of his age and was fired for that reason. He sued his 
employer for terminating his employment in violation of a public policy against age 
discrimination. The Utah Supreme Court stated: 
An at-will employee may overcome that presumption be demonstrating that (1) 
there is an implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated 
only for cause or upon satisfaction of another agree-upon condition; (2) a statute 
or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under 
certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of 
a clear and substantial public policy, [citations omitted] In that case, we further 
remarked that not every employment termination that has the effect of violating 
some public policy is actionable: "a public policy whose contravention is 
achieved by an employment termination must be 'clear and substantial' to be 
actionable." Declarations of public policy can be found in constitutions and 
statutes, but not all statements made in statutes are expressions of public policy. 
LI at 1263 (quoting Fox v. MCI Communications Corp., 931 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1997). 
In Burton, the plaintiff relied solely on the UADA to establish a clear and substantial 
public policy against age discrimination. The Court was not persuaded that the UADA alone 
established a clear and substantial public policy against age discrimination with respect to small 
employers (i.e. employers with less than fifteen employees). The Court stated, 
This exemption of small employers from the FEHA ban on age discrimination 
was enacted simultaneously to and is inseparable from the legislative statement of 
policy. For that reason, and because no other statute or constitutional provision 
bars age discrimination, we conclude that there presently exists no 'fundamental 
policy' which precludes age discrimination by a small employer. 
Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). However, the Court also specifically limited its decision to 
claims of age discrimination, stating, "Suffice it to say that sex, race, religion, and disability may 
present different considerations and a public policy against discrimination on those grounds 
might conceivably be found in other statues of this state. That question is not before us and we 
express no opinion on that subject." Id 
Separate and apart from the UADA, the Utah Civil Rights Act also prohibits 
discrimination based on sex, but notably, leaves out any mention of age discrimination.2 Utah 
Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000). Additionally, the plaintiff has cited ten executive orders from 
governors of the State of Utah, including our current governor, all forbidding the practice of 
sexual harassment in every workplace in which state employees are required to conduct business. 
Finally, plaintiff has cited to 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et. seq. as evidence of an overriding federal 
public policy against sexual discrimination. In light of these statements of public policy from 
the Utah legislature, the Utah executive branch, and Congress, this Court is persuaded that there 
is a clear and substantial public policy forbidding discrimination based on sex. Therefore, the 
Plaintiff has stated a cognizable cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of public 
policy 
The remaining issue is whether the Plaintiffs claim is pre-empted by the UADA. There 
is no controlling authority on this issue, and therefore, the Court will borrow from the reasoning 
of another jurisdiction. In Molesworth v. Randall 672 A.2d 608 (Md. Ct. App. 1996), the 
Maryland Court of Appeals ruled that Maryland's version of the Anti-Discrimination Act did not 
preempt a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee by an employer 
with less than fifteen employees. The Maryland Court reasoned that it would be improper to 
assume that the legislature meant to insulate employers with less than fifteen employees from the 
2
 It is hereby declared that the practice of discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, sex, religion, ancestry, or national origin in 
business establishments or places of public accommodation or in 
enterprises regulated by the state endangers the health, safety, and 
general welfare of this state and its inhabitants; and that such 
discrimination in business establishments or places of public 
accommodation or in enterprises regulated by the state, violates the 
public policy of this state. 
Utah Code Ann. § 13-7-1 (2000) (emphasis added.) 
state public policy against discrimination based on sex. Rather, a more accurate interpretation of 
the legislature's intent was that the exception for employers with less than fifteen employees was 
a means to avoid overburdening the administrative agency responsible for enforcing the Act. 
The Court correctly pointed out that, had the legislature intended to protect small employers from 
common law wrongful discharge, it could have included small employees in the Act and thus 
preempted the field of employment discrimination entirely. 
Similarly, in Utah, our state legislature could have preempted the field of employment 
discrimination, but chose not to. It would be inequitable to find that there is a clear public policy 
against discrimination on the basis of sex, but that small employers are granted a license to 
discriminate and their employees have no recourse available to them. Therefore, the Court finds 
that the UADA does not preempt Plaintiffs common law cause of action for wrongful 
termination in violation of public policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment is granted with respect to affirmative defenses four and five. 
The remaining issue raised in the parties' cross motions for summary judgment is 
whether the Defendant can be held personally liable for the wrongful termination alleged by the 
Plaintiff, or whether Plaintiff must name the corporate employer P.R., Inc. as a defendant. The 
Court will hold off reaching a decision on that issue for two reasons. First, the Plaintiff has 
sought leave to amend her complaint to name P.R., Inc. as a defendant. The Court will grant 
Plaintiff leave to amend her complaint should she choose to do so. However, the Court will not 
issue an advisory opinion as to whether Mr. Peterson would be personally liable while plaintiffs 
motion to amend her complaint is pending. 
Second, Plaintiff has filed a Rule 56(f) motion asking the Court to refrain from ruling on 
the issue of Mr. Peterson's liability until she has had an opportunity to take his deposition. 
Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Peterson did not maintain the corporate formalities separating 
himself from P.R., Inc. The Plaintiff is entitled to discover whether the interests and ownership 
of the corporation were such that they justify piercing the corporate veil. Therefore, Plaintiffs 
Rule 56(f) motion is granted. 
Defendant's Motion for Protective Order and Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavit 
of the Plaintiff are denied. 
Dated this / / day of March, 2001 
District Court Judge 
